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CONGRESSIONALDYSFUN&TIONANDEXECUTIVE
LAWMAKINGDURINGTHEOBAMAADMNISTRATION
RAQUEL ALDANA 1
The essays in this symposium volume were presented at the
2015 Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Annual Meeting
as part of an academic program titled Congressional Dysfunction and
Executive Lawmaking During the Obama Administration.The inspiration for the title came from the simultaneous reactions of tamed enthusiasm 2 and anger to a memorandum issued by Secretary Jeh
Charles Johnson of the U.S Department of Homeland Security on November 14, 2014, titled Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion With Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children
[(DACA II)] and With Respect to Certain Individuals Who are Parents
of U.S. Citizens and Permanent Residents [(DAPA)]. 3 The memorandum expanded on an earlier one adopted by then Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security on June 15, 2012, titled Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came
to the United States asChildren [(DACA I)]. 4 Combined, these memoranda constituted executive actions that would potentially defer the
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1. Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship and Professor of Law, McGeorge School of
Law, University of the Pacific. I thank Professors Jennifer Chacón and Alina Das for co-organizing with me the AALS academic program. Thanks also to Tania Dominguez for her great research assistance. I congratulate the Chicago-Kent Law Review editors for their incredible
professionalism.
2. Enthusiasm came from pro-immigrant groups and from the beneficiaries of deferred
action. Enthusiasm was tamed because some felt deferred action came too late or was too
limited or did not compensate for the aggressive enforcement policies during the Obama administration. See e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration
Law Redux, 124 YALE L.J.2 (forthcoming 2015)
3. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to León
Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with
Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain
Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014) (on
file at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf).
4. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Homeland Sec., to David V.
Aguilaret al., Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion
with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012) (on file
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-whocame-to-us-as-children.pdf).
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removal of an estimated four to six million 5 eligible undocumented
persons for a few years. 6 Those granted the deferral would also obtain work authorization 7 and with it social security numbers and
driver’s licenses. 8 To date, however, just over one million applicants
have been granted deferred action under these memoranda. 9 The explanation for this is two-fold. First, the anticipated number of applicants were either over estimations or fewer than those eligible
actually applied. 10 Second, twenty-six states immediately challenged
the legality of the November 14 memorandum in a federal district
court in Brownsville, Texas, which granted the preliminary injunction
in February 2015. 11 The suit alleged that the memorandum violated,
inter alia, the Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by not following the required procedures (namely, the notice and comment period), and by exceeding
statutory authority. 12 In May 2015, the Fifth Circuit refused to lift the
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5. County Level DACA-DAPA Estimates by Country or Region, MIGRATION POLICY INST.
(2014),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/datahub/DACA-DAPA2013State%20Estimates-Spreadsheet-FINAL.xlsx.
6. The deferred action program as adopted in 2012 was originally for two years, renewable for another two. In 2014, deferred action contemplated three additional years attached to
the original DACA grant.
7. Eligibility is to three subgroups: DACA I, created by the June 12, 2012 memorandum
and expanded in 2014, applied to children who arrived in the U.S. prior to June 12, 2007 at the
age of 16 or younger; who either crossed the border without authorization or with visas since
expired; who had resided continuously in the U.S. since that date; who had graduated from high
school or were enrolled in high school or in military service; who were not over 31 at the time of
the application; and who were not disqualified based on the commission of certain crimes. See
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano to David V. Aguilar, supra note 4. DACA II, created by the
November 14, 2014 memorandum, expanded the DACA I program to eliminate the 31-year cap
and to extend the date of eligibility arrival as of November 14, 2010. Finally, DAPA, created by
the November 14, 2014 memorandum, extended deferred action to undocumented parents of
children born in the United States or those who had LPR status and who also satisfied the
requirements of a minimum of five-year residency in the U.S. and no significant criminal record.
See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson to León Rodríguez, supra note 3.
8. Frequently Asked Questions: The Obama Administration’s DAPA and Expanded DACA
Programs, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR. (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.nilc.org/dapa&daca.html.
9. Number of I-821D, Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals by Fiscal
Year, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (June 30, 2015), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All
%20Form%20Types/DACA/I821d_performancedata_fy2015_qtr3.pdf.
10. Two Years and Counting: Assessing the Growing Power of DACA, AM. IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL (June 15, 2014), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/two-years-andcounting-assessing-growing-power-daca.
11. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
12. Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, State of Texas et al. v. United
States et al., No. 1:14-cv-254 (5th Cir. Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/files/epress/files/ImmigrationStatesFirstAmendedLawsuit12092014.pdf.
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injunction issued by the Brownsville federal district court, and in November 2015, a divided Fifth Circuit panel upheld the district court's
order. 13 As a result, the November 14 Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals extension (DACA II) and the Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans (DAPA) programs have yet to be implemented. In contrast,
the June 2012 DACA I program survived a similar legal challenge—
also in the Fifth Circuit 14—leading to a Circuit split.
In this symposium issue, 15 the essays discuss the Obama administration’s immigration deferred actions, 16 but also expand the conversation of alleged executive overreach to other areas, including
immigration enforcement, 17 climate change, 18 women’s rights, 19 employment discrimination, 20 environmental justice, 21 affirmative action, 22 and national security. 23 The AALS program sought to bring
together scholars writing in these various areas to critically examine
important themes of separation of powers, federalism, and rights.
Was the accusation of executive overreach even correct? If so, was
the accusation unique to the Obama administration, at least as compared to previous administrations? Was the Obama administration
justified in acting alone in a climate of congressional gridlock and partisanship? How might legitimacy be assessed during the Obama administration in these areas of law? Should the lens for measuring
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13. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015); Texas v. United States, No. 1540238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015).
14. Crane ex. rel. Gov. Bryant v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2015).
15. Other important topics not covered in these essays concerned the Obama administration’s actions in the area of gay rights, clean energy and health. Other examples where the
Obama administration allegedly has abused its executive power include welfare laws, and drug
policy. See, e.g., Ted Cruz, Lawless: The Obama Administration’s Expansion of Executive
Power, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 2, 5–16 (2014).
16. Jill E. Family, The Executive Power of Process in Immigration Law, 91 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 59 (2016); Catherine Y. Kim, Presidential Legitimacy Through the Anti-Discrimination Lens,
91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 207 (2016).
17. Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State Noncooperation and Sanctuary Cites After Secure Communities, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 12 (2016).
18. Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, The Grass is Not Always Greener: Congressional
Dysfunction, Executive Action, And Climate Change in Comparative Perspective, 91 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 139 (2016).
19. Pat Treuthart, Feminist-In-Chief? Examining President Obama’s Executive Orders on
Women’s Rights Issues, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 171 (2016).
20. Id.; Kim, supra note 16.
21. Rachael E. Salcido, Reviving the Environmental Justice Agenda, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
115 (2016); Kim, supra note 16.
22. Kim, supra note 16.
23. Sudha Setty, Obama’s National Security Exceptionalism, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 91
(2016).
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24. Jessie Hill, Executive Discretion and the Administrative State Symposium: Introduction, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 891, 891–92 (2015).
25. Gerhard Peters, Executive Order: Washington-Obama, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT
(Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/orders.php.
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legitimacy be legal or procedural fairness over outcome; that is, irrespective of the pragmatic necessity to govern despite all odds, should
considerations of checks and balances and federalism trump? Alternatively, should the ends of doing justice or the urgency of the problem justify the means? Was the perception of President Obama
furthering a “progressive” agenda largely through his administration
even accurate? The essays in this issue offer great insights into these
questions.
Empirically, it is no easy task to decipher whether the Obama
administration was any more or less active in exercising sole executive powers to govern in comparison to other administrations. This inquiry is at least important because the critics of the Obama
administration start from the untested premise that the Obama administration has been worse in abusing the office of the U.S. presidency. 24 One imperfect measurement has been to consider the
number of executive orders issued during this administration as compared to past administrations. As it turns out, sixteen presidents have
issued more executive orders than President Obama. Moreover,
President Obama’s number of executive orders to date—216—pale
in comparison to the top five presidents whose executive orders range
from 907 (Harry S. Truman) to 3,721 (Franklin D. Roosevelt). 25 However, as the essays in this issue demonstrate, presidents govern not
principally through executive orders but rather through mechanisms
or tools available to them through the administrative state. The essays
in this issue discuss executive orders issued during the Obama administration, but they also focus on agency internal memoranda such
as the deferred action programs; inter-agency collaboration agreements; memoranda of understanding or collaboration agreements
with local governments; funding initiatives; and agreements with international inter-governmental entities. Further, comparative numbers
of executive orders alone do not tell us much absent a deeper analysis of the nature and scope of each executive action. Not all executive
orders, memoranda, or initiatives are created equal, even from the
narrow inquiries regarding the legal authority to issue them or proce-
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26. Chen, supra note 17, at 14.
27. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2011).
28. Id. at § 553.
29. See, e.g., J. Brad Bernthal, Procedural Architecture Matters: Innovation at the Federal
Communications Commission, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 615 (2014).
30. Id.
31. Administrative Procedure Act § 552.
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dural fairness, much less in terms of the broader legitimacy considerations that might take into account such factors as urgency and moral
imperatives.
This issue’s essays illustrate the complexity of assessing legitimacy for sole executive actions—whether legal, procedural or
moral—and the need to do so on a case-by-case basis. Professor
Ming H. Chen’s essay titled Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State
Noncooperation and Sanctuary Cities After Secure Communities provides a strong theoretical framing of the legitimacy inquiry. As she
explains, “[t]he concept of legitimacy is defined as the recognition of
the executive branch’s authority to govern is appropriate, proper, and
just.” 26 In the case-by-case assessment, the essays illustrate how legitimacy might be tested through several lenses. For example, one
important lens pertains to procedural fairness. In Professor Jill Family’s essay titled The Executive Power of Process in Immigration Law,
she does not focus her analysis on the more commonly-posed question of whether the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) acted
within the permissible scope of prosecutorial or statutory discretion
when issuing the DACA and DAPA memoranda. Instead, her focus
turns to procedural fairness in administrative lawmaking, as these
standards are codified in the Administrative Procedure Act. 27 Under
the APA, an agency’s rulemaking is governed by notice and comment
procedures, 28 which are supposed to function—at least in theory—to
improve transparency and public participation. 29 Yet, not only with regard to DACA and DAPA, 30 administrative agencies, including immigration agencies, generally prefer to govern through memoranda over
rulemaking, which does not require the same transparency and public
participation under the APA. 31 As Professor Family explains in her
essay, however, there are procedural concerns with agencies opting
out of the rulemaking process that should be examined more closely.
Another important procedural consideration is respect for important structural principles designed to curb abuses of power, such
as checks and balances. These checks and balances can occur horizontally, through interventions by the other branches of government,
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32. Setty, supra note 23.
33. See Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and the Structural Constitution: Navigating the
Separation of Powers Both Vertically and Horizontally, 115 COLUM L. REV. 4, 13 (2015).
34. Rich Tucker & Elizabeth Slattery, Morning Bell: 5 Ways Obama Has Trampled the Constitution, DAILY SIGNAL (Sept. 17, 2013), http://dailysignal.com/2013/09/17/morning-bell-5-waysobama-has-trampled-the-constitution/.
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or vertically, through the relationship of the federal government with
localities. Horizontal checks and balances would include robust judicial review or congressional participation. Here, important initial analysis has to happen on a case-by-case basis to decide two distinct
types of questions: (1) Does the U.S. Constitution permit the president
to act alone? (i.e., is this an area of legal exceptionalism?); and (2)
Whether the president is, in fact, acting without congressional approval, in the face of congressional approval, or against congressional
mandate. Predictably, there is disagreement even on these preliminary questions. As these essays suggest, President Obama has resorted to three types of sole executive powers to act alone:
immigration prosecutorial discretion, foreign affairs, and national security. Whether President Obama has the legal authority to act alone,
however, deserves scrutiny, which Professor Sudha Setty powerfully
executes in his essay titled Obama’s National Security Exceptionalism. Professor Setty’s article offers perhaps the most damning critique of the Obama presidency for three related reasons: first, it
questions whether President Obama is legitimately resorting to national security powers to continue, inter alia, to detain indefinitely
those accused of terrorism; second, it challenges the assumption that
the Obama presidency has largely acted to preserve rights; and third,
it highlights the abuses that can occur when checks and balances—
here, the absence of judicial scrutiny—are non-existent. 32
Checks and balances are not only offered through judicial oversight. It can also occur in the dynamics between the federal government and states in the implementation of policies—a vertical checks
and balances. 33 The Obama presidency has also been singled out for
allegedly trampling on state rights. 34 However, one theme of the AALS
session on federalism, which is also revealed in these essays, is that
claims of the Obama administration’s disregard for state rights have
been largely overstated. In his relationship with states, President
Obama has found more success in promoting his policy agenda
through cooperative federalism models (instead of coercive methods)
than he has with Congress. Moreover, the administration has been
more willing to shift its practices in response to state pressure. In this
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35. Salcido, supra note 21, at Part III A & B. The article also discusses the Obama administration’s greater use of its enforcement authority under the the existing statutory framework to
advance environmental justice initiatives. These enforcement actions, however, are contemplated under existing statutes, such as the Clean Air Act, and do not involve sole executive
actions. Id. at Part IIC.
36. Chen, supra note 17, at 20.
37. Id.
38. Ming H. Chen, Understanding the Legitimacy of Executive Action in Immigration Law,
INST. OF HIGHER LEARNING 34–35 (2015).
39. Brief for the Mayors of New York and Los Angeles et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellants, Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-40238); Brief for the
States of Washington et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the United States, Texas v. United
States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-40238).
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sense, the evidence suggests that there have been more robust vertical checks and balances during the Obama administration than is
otherwise acknowledged. Several essays in this issue illustrate these
points. For example, Professor Rachael E. Salcido’s essay titled Reviving the Environmental Justice Agenda documents the methodology employed by the Obama administration to promote environmental
justice as largely consisting of federal inter-agency collaboration with
the public in order to document the needs of communities, produce
data that can be useful in understanding the nature and scope of the
environmental justice gap, and ameliorate problems with the provision
of federal grants. 35 Professor Chen describes a more elastic cooperation continuum in the area of immigration law that extends from “willing embrace of federal policy and national standards to uncooperative
behavior that can revise, reshape or reject national standards.” 36 The
key is that states and other localities, by choosing not to cooperate
with federal policy, can weaken, slow, or redirect the federal mandate. 37
In the area of DACA and DAPA, both cooperative and uncooperative federalism dynamics have been at play. The twenty-six states
that sued the federal government for the extended DACA and DAPA
programs have a more nuanced story to tell. Many of the states who
opposed DACA and DAPA, on their own volition, adopted favorable
policies toward the benefitted undocumented populations—i.e., by
granting in-state tuition or issuing driver’s licenses—even prior to the
recent orders. 38 Moreover, over fifteen states and the District of Columbia, and more than seventy city officials, joined an amicus brief in
support of the DACA expansion and DAPA arguing that these programs offered economic benefits to the local communities. 39 Professor Chen’s article documents the rise and fall of Secure Communities
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40. Chen, supra note 17, at Part II.
41. See Christine N. Cimini, Hands Off Fingerprints: State, Local, and Individual Defiance
of Federal Immigration Enforcement, 47 CONN. L. REV. 101, 120 (2014).
42. Chen, supra note 17, at 21–22.
43. Id. at 40–41.
44. Ezra Kein, 14 Reasons Why This is the Worst Congress Ever, WASH. POST (July 13,
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2012/07/13/13-reasons-why-this-isthe-worst-congress-ever/.
45. Marisa Bono, When a Rose is Not a Rose: DACA, The Dream Act, and the Need for
More Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 40 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 193, 207–08 (2015).
46. Deborah J. Vagins, Equal Pay by the Numbers, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 4,
2014, 12:02 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/equal-pay-numbers.
47. Sarah Binder, Polarized We Govern?, BROOKINGS INST. (May 27, 2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/05/27-polarized-we-govern-congress-legislative-gridlock-polarized-binder.
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also as a direct result of state noncooperation. 40 Secure Communities
is yet another controversial sole executive immigration program that
began under President George W. Bush’s administration, but which
was fully implemented during the Obama administration. 41 Secure
Communities is the foil of DACA and DAPA since it secures removal
of undocumented persons arrested through a mechanism of fingerprinting at booking and information-gathering with immigration databases that function in every local jail as of 2013. 42 As Professor Chen
describes in her essay, state and local resistance to Secure Communities has now discontinued the program and yielded a new program
instead, known as Priority Enforcement Program, as of November
2014. 43 Largely, this significant shift is a direct result of strong upward
vertical pressures of resistance on the federal government.
The legitimacy discussions above cannot be disengaged from
other important contexts: one is the political, the second is the moral.
With regard to politics, the question is whether legitimacy inquiries
over the Obama administration’s sole acts alone should alter when
considering Congress’ fervent refusal to facilitate almost all policies
of the Obama administration—seemingly for political rather than substantive reasons. 44 Congressional Dysfunction, the beginning title of
the AALS program and of this preface, certainly implies that congressional inaction constitutes a dysfunction that enhances the legitimacy
of the Obama administration’s response to act alone. DACA and
DAPA after all are the by-product of at least a decade of repeated
attempts to pass the Dream Act; 45 similar stories of congressional
gridlock can also be told of women’s rights to equal pay 46 and climate
change, 47 to name a few. Professors Hari Osofsky and Jacqueline

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 13 Side A

1

12/28/2015 14:43:02

Aldana Final (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

12/10/201510:54 AM

PREFACE

11

12/28/2015 14:43:02

48. Osofsky & Peel, supra note 18, at 143.
49. Id. at 143-44.
50. Id. at Part II(C).
51. The notable exceptions include President Obama’s national security and immigration
enforcement measures, which are discussed in this volume in the essays by Professor Sudha
Setty and Ming H. Chen, respectively.

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 13 Side A

Peel, in their essay titled The Grass is Not Always Greener: Congressional Dysfunction, Executive Action, and Climate Change in Comparative Perspectives remind us, however, that legislative gridlock is
not a structural flaw of our form of government; rather, it is simply the
result of what happens in a strong system of checks and balances
when the country is closely divided on issues along partisan lines. 48
The United States as a nation has experienced a worsening of partisanship across the board in the past two decades. 49 This, and not
“congressional dysfunction,” is at the core of the governing challenge.
An alternative form of government such as that of Australia in which
the legislative body and the Prime Minister share the same political
party results in different expression of the system that is in the end
not much better; namely, flip flop (where policies change from administration to administration) over gridlock. 50 Either case results in policies and practices not guaranteed to last beyond the administration,
despite the best of intentions. If we agree with the Obama administration’s policies, our inclination might well be to perceive sole administrative acts as necessary and good to move the country forward.
Nevertheless, Professors Osofsky and Peel insightfully remind us that
the costs to this is its very temporariness. The arduous and long task
of bringing the nation closer is still necessary to effectuate lasting
change.
Finally, the legitimacy of the Obama administration’s acts cannot
be disengaged from perceptions over their moral imperative. The
moral inquiry asks whether the end justifies the means insofar as the
administration must act either to avoid a great harm or to remedy a
terrible injustice. Here, however, there will inevitably be disagreements over the urgency or the justice of the measures. In general, the
Obama administration’s actions have been to push for rights or for
environmental justice, with notable exceptions. 51 Professor Mary Pat
Treuthart in her essay titled Feminist-In-Chief? Examining President
Obama’s Executive Orders on Women’s Rights Issues, for example,
documents how, by and large, the Obama administration has fared
well in terms of the promotion of the rights of women, such as in the
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areas of gender-based violence, reproductive rights, and employment. 52 This preface has also alluded several times to the significant
benefit from a rights-based perspective that DACA and DAPA have
represented to thousands of immigrants. In each of these areas, although, the Obama administration has had to weigh or bear the political costs of furthering a particular policy that is too controversial in the
context of a deeply divided nation. For example, Professor Treuthart
raises two exceptions to the Obama administration’s otherwise favorable assessment with regard to women: the treatment of abortion
funding under the Affordable Care Act and the issue of sexual assault
in the military. 53 In the area of immigration, the “deporter-in-chief” label given to President Obama for his role in deporting more immigrants than any other president of the United States, 54 did not shield
him from the fury against his DACA and DAPA measures. This phenomenon is documented well in Professor Catherine Y. Kim’s essay
titled Presidential Legitimacy Through the Anti-Discrimination Lens.
Professor Kim makes the important point that the pro-immigration
measures had a greater political cost for the Obama administration
than other less-controversial measures (such as in the areas of environmental justice and women’s rights) even when these measures
also raised equivalent concerns over the structural problems of separation of powers and checks and balances. 55
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52. Treuthart, supra note 19.
53. Id. at 197-200.
54. Anna Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel Krogstad, U.S. Deportations of Immigrants
Reach Record High in 2013, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/10/02/u-s-deportations-of-immigrants-reach-record-high-in-2013/.
55. Kim, supra note 16.

